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THAT the ballot, which for years has been used in

every election district in this country, except for general
elections in Kentucky, was employed in order to secure
secrecy, and that its use implied secrecy, has been repeatedly
decided by our courts, 2 while the benefit which this secrecy
conferred upon the individual voter and the community at
large has often been dwelt upon by text-writers.3 The theory
of the old form of ballot was that the voter prepared or
By the new constitution of Kentucky viva voce voting at general
elections is abolished, and all elections are by ballot. It is in curious
contrast to the conservatism which retained viva voce voting for so long
that the first American secret ballot law, a very effective adaptation of
the Australian system, was the Louisville election law of February 24,
1883, under which the first American election by secret ballot took place
December 4, 1888.
2
See Jones z'. Glidewell, 53 Ark., 16r; Williams v. Stein, 38 Ind., 89;
People v. Cicott, 16 Mich., 283; Common Council v. Rush, 82 Id.; 532;
Brisbin z. Cleary, 26 Minn., 1o; Commonwealth v. Wcelper, 3 S. & R.
(Pa.), 29, 37; Kneass' Case, 2 Pars. Eq. (Pa.), 553, 585: Temple v. Mead,
4 Vt., 535, 541; State v. Hilmantel, 23 Wis., 422.
3
See Cooley's Const. Lims. (6th Ed.), 76o.
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provided it himself, so that he alone knew its contents, but
the inevitable assumption by party organizations of the
task of preparing and distributing the printed ballots used
has for many decades done away with almost every vestige
of actual secrecy, all legal theory to the contrary notwithstanding.
The so-called Australian ballot laws, adopted during
the past five years by all but nine States and three territories of the Union, have merely given at last to the old
doctrine of the secret ballot a practical application that it
has too long lacked. The methods, however, which these
statutes provide for the conduct of elections, involve
developments of election law new to this country, and
some of them without legal precedent anywhere. Those
provisions which have been adopted directly from the law
of Great Britain and her colonies may be construed in the
light of the decisions of the British and colonial courts, but
such matters as the restrictions of the right to nominate,
the functions of political parties in regard to nominations,
or the system, prov'ided in several States, of either voting a
"straight ticket" by a single mark, or marking each candidate's name separately, are not merely new, but, being
either of home manufacture or continental importation,
raise questions which cannot be decided by reference to
any reported cases whatever.
Considering the vast territory and the number of independent jurisdictipns- into which the secret ballot system
has been almost simultaneously introduced, and the new
uses to which it has, been applied, it is but natural that
many legal questions should have arisen in both the classes
of cases above mentioned. .That the .volume of litigation
has not been greater testifies to the general popular understanding of the secret ballot system and the determination
to secure all the benefits of a proper enforcement of the
spirit of the new laws as well as of their letter. It is
noticeable, too, that the nfumber of cases would have been
less but for those provisions which needlessly vary from the
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Australian. system proper, and which have always been
most strongly objected to by the advocates of ballot reform.'
The legal questions which have arisen can be properly
understood, and the decisions intelligently considered, only
in the light of existing facts in regard to American elections, facts so familiar that their importance is often overlooked, but which must, nevertheless, be noticed with
some detail in the following pages. The practical effect of
similar laws elsewhere in remedying the evils which the
American secret ballot acts were designed to cure must
also be borne in mind, and to the influence of these considerations upon the courts is due the fact that their
decisions have been, to a remarkable degree, uniform, wise
and tending to uphold the effective working of these laws.
The opinions d~livered clearly show that the laws
have invariably been approached in a favorable and not a
hostile spirit. Thus, in State v. Black, 2 in New Jersey,
REED, J., after an interesting sketch of the rise and object
of the ballot reform movement, said: "Now, I think this
recapitulation of the purposes and results of the class of
acts of which our own is a specimen has a pertinency to
the questions mooted in this case; for I think that any provision in such an act which is likely to bring about a
result which conduces to the purity of popular elections
should receive a favorable consideration. It is, of course,
true that if the effect of any provision is to shut off the
voter from the ballot box, such provision "must fall before
the constitutional guaranty of the right to vote. But in
measuring cases of mere inconvenience, expense or senti'For cases under these provisions see Eaton v. Brown (Cal.), 31
Pac. Rep.; Talcott v. Philbrick, 59 Conn., 472; Fields v. Osborne, 6o
Conn., 544; State v. Walsh (Conn.), 25 Atl. Rep., Y; Fisher v. Dudley, 74
Md., 242; People v. Board of Canvassers, 129 N. Y., 395; People v. Shaw,
133 N. Y., 493; People v. Kaiser, 25 Abb., N. C. (N. V.), 462; People v.
Person, i9 N. Y. Supp., 297; De Walt v. Bartley, 146 Pa., 529; McKee's
Rocks Election, i Dist. Rep. (Pa.), 240.
2 24 Atl. Rep., 489.
Similar references to ballot-reform history in
the interpretation of the l].v occr in State v. Russell (Neb.), 5i N, W.

Rep., 465.
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ment, the existence of a salutary purpose, and the likelihood of the provision tending to accomplish that purpose,
must weigh greatly in determining the reasonableness of
the statutory regulation."
The. Supreme Court of Missouri has taken similar
ground, saying: "This 'ballot reform law' was intended
to improve the methods for giving expression to the popular
will in the choice of public officers. It should be construed so as to promote, not to destroy, the great objects in
view in its passage." 1 And this language is but re-echoed
by the words of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: "The
law itself may be regarded in the light of an attempt on the
part of the people to secure a pure, free and unintimidated
ballot. Every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of the law."'
The questions which have called for decision may be
grouped into three classes, as they respectively concern
nominations, the form.and use of the ballot, and errors of
public officers.
I Cases in Regard to Nominations.-The most important cases of this class are those which have involved the
right of a legislature to regulate nominations, and the right
of a convention or other meeting to make nominations in
behalf of a political party.
In considering the limits of a legislature's right to
regulate nominations no aid can be obtained froii foreign
decisions, as
h in England (where, indeed, the "omnipotence" of Parliament would, in any case, have prevented
the question from arising) and the colonies it has never
been sought to limit the right of nomination further than
by a property qualification for holding office or the requirement of a money deposit with each nomination, to be forfeited if the candidate fail to receive a specified percentage
of the 'vote.

Apart from these restrictions, which are not

universal, a nomination is made in the British dominions
by a paper filed by one proposer and one or a very few
'Bowers v. SmIth,
2De

20

S. W. Rep., ioi.

Walt v. Bartley, 146 Pa.,

529.
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seconders. In America, however, the great number of the
elective offices has almost necessarily made the making of
nominations a sort of business by itself, while the fact that
party spirit and the *expense involved by the open-ballot
system have for years made a party nomination essential to
success in the case of every important office, and greatly
conducive thereto in all cases, has given such a nomination
a privileged character, something more than the mere suggestion that Mr. A or Mr. B is a person whom certain
citizens would like to see chosen by the free and independent electors. Most of our legislatures have clearly been
dominated by a conviction that the field of nominations
was one where the party leaders might indeed rush in but
which the ordinary citizen must fear to tread. Should
nominations be made easy, outside the leading party
organizations, the ballots might not only be inconveniently
increased in size, but the importance of the "regular"
candidates might be diminished.
Accordingly, almost
all the American secret ballot laws provide that organized political parties may make their nominations by
the easy method of filing a certificate, while unorganized
aggregations of citizens, even if they assemble in a public
meeting, can nominate only by obtaining a number of signatures to a nomination paper, the number required being
in some States fairly reasonable, in others so large as to
make such nominations almost impossible. The difficulty
of nominating by this method is also increased in some
States by requiring all the signers to acknowledge, or even
swear to, their signatures.
A legislature's power to regulate nominations must have
some limits, and these must be conterminous with the free
and convenient exercise of the right of suffrage by the voter.
Under the Australian system legal nomination is almost a
prerequisite of election, -as only the names of those candidates who have been legally nominated can be printed on
the ballots, and tlese alone can be conveniently voted for.
The right to vote, which may be defined as the right to
declare a preference for any one legally qualified to hold
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the office to be filled whom the voter may choose, and this
on substantially equal terms with every other voter, necessarily includes, therefore; under this system, the right to
designate the candidate of one's choice, so that his name
may be printed on the ballots, for thus only can the voter
declare his preference on substantially equal terms with
every other voter. Clearly the right to nominate cannot be
impaired without affecting the right to vote.
Although no instance is recorded of nominations so
numerous as to make the ballot too large for practical use,
such a contingency is possible, and can be lawfully guarded
against by legislation. Accordingly, it has properly been
held in Michigan that to require that a candidate be placed
in nomination by electors of his district, and that such"nomination be so made as "to represent the wishes of a respectable portion of the electors," does not deny the legal right
of any elector to announce either himself or any one else
as a candidate, but merely places reasonable restrictions
upon the privilege of bringing the candidate before the
voters by, the convenient miethod of having his name
printed on the official ballots at public expense. "Any
one," said the Court, "has the right to announce himself
as a candidate, but if all persons who should so announce
themselves as candidates are of right to have their names
printed upon the ballot, it is evident that the purposes of the
law might be frustrated by filling the ballot with the names
of independent candidates for such office. The law does
not deny to any person the right to be voted for upon the
ballot, but, in cases where the person is not the nominee
of a convention called for the purpose of making nominations, the person can be voted for by writing his name upon
the ballot in the blank required to be preserved for that
purpose in the ballot."' As such blank spaces are provided
for by every secret ballot law, no voter is limited in his
choice to the candidates officially nominated,' but may
I Chateau v. Jacob,
2

88 Mich., 170.
Bowers z. Smith (Mo.),-2o S. W. Rep., ioi; Price

Mont., 6i.

v. Lush, 16
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insert other names by writing or any other means that the
language of the law permits.'
In the Michigan case above cited, the Court did not
say what would constitute a "respectable portion" of the
electors nor at what point the respectability might become
exclusiveness, but simply held that the Michigan law, authorizing "the names of the candidates nominated by the
regularly called conventions of any party" to be printed
on the ballots, a mandamus to compel the printing of a
name could not issue when it did not "appear that the
relator was selected by an assemblage or meeting of electors of his ward," language apparently used as equivalent
to the statutory words, "the regularly called conventions of
any party."
In most States the right to make Iegal nominations is
rather more restricted than it is in Michigan. In Pennsylvania, for instance, a certificate of nomination cdn be filed
only by a political party which has at the previous election
cast 3 per cent. of the total vote, while the number of qualified electors who must sign a nomination paper for the
State at large is fixed at one-half of I per cent. of the largest
vote cast at the last election for any officer elected in the,
State, and in other cases the number is 3 per cent. of the
largest vote cast at the last election for any officer elected
in the district for which the nomination is made. It has
there been held that the provision restricting the right to
nominate by certificate to political parties of the size above
mentioned was but a reasonable regulation in regard to
the printing of the ballots, not interfering with the rights
of the citizen as a voter, nor imposing any inconvenience
upon him.' Whether the restrictions in regard to nomination by signatures were reasonable or not was not decided,
no attempt to raise the question having been made.
In New Jersey 5 per cent. of the vote is required for
the party nomination, while the number of signatures
required is fixed at I per cent. of the vote for State offices,
IDe

Walt v. Bartley, 146 Pa.,
2 Ibid.
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"and 5 per cent. for other offices, but with a maximum of 2oo
in any case. The Supreme Court has there held that while
"these regulations may not be the wisest that could have
been adopted,' still they are regulations which do not
seriously impair the right of any citizen to vote. They are
intended to restrict 'the number of party tickets within
reasonable limits, while at the same time permitting any
body of citizens whose number is sufficient to give importance to a concerted political movement to organize as a
party." 1

The above decisions are the only ones which have as yet
been rendered in regard to a legislature's power to restrict
the right to nominate, as People v. Rice, 2 merely interprets
the obscure language of a minor provision of the New York
Act of 189o, under which 250 signatures were required for
a county or district nomination paper, unless any portion of
the district were in New York or Kings Counties, or
New York city or Brooklyn, in which case ioo signatures sufficed. These decisions uphold the power of restriction as necessary to the carrying out of the system of
official ballots, but they do not indicate the limits of that
power, limits which unquestionably exist. In the New
Jersey case the comparatively reasonable number of signatures needed for a nomination by that means modified to
some extent the effect of the rather high percentage required for a party nomination, whereas in the Pennsylvania
case, as already stated, The reasonableness of the restrictions
upon the former method was not passed upon. In most
States the restrictions- seem so reasonable as to prevent
any serious attempt to break them down, but it is possible
that under the less liberal laws of California, New York,
Pennsylvania, and perhaps a few other States, an application for a mandamus, accompanied by proof of inability to
nominate by either method, might result in a decision that
-the legislature had exercised its power oppressively, and
that its restrictions were therefore void.
'State v. Black, 24 At. Rep., 489.
2 25 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.), 46o.

\ME,RIAN

i
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All the American ballot reform laws recognize political
parties and their properly-organized conventions or caucuses as a part of the machinery by which elections are
carried tn. To these bodies certain important privileges
in regard to nominations are given, privileges sometimes
contended for by rival claimants of the part, title. In
Delaware such contentions are not likely to arise, as the
statute defines a political party as'an organization of bona
fide citizens and voters of any county (to the number of at
least one hundred in any county in which it exists) "which
shall, by means of a convention, primary meeting or otherwise, nominate candidates for public offices to be filled by
the people"' at any general or special election within the
State; but in other States the courts have had to decide
between contestants.
In States where legal nominations can be made by any
political party, the only question that can arise is as to
whether the pArty whose members undertake to make
nominations really exists as a party. Thus in a Connecticut case2 it appeared that in a certain town a regular
Republican caucus was called and organized and it then
voted to adjourn. Thereupon some Democrats who were
present, but had not participated, acted with the fifty
Republicans present in organizing a citizens' caucus and
nominating a citizens' ticket, composed of candidates from
both parties. A collection was taken to pay for printing
the tickets.' No committees were appointed to carry out
the purposes of the caucus, nor steps taken to effect a
permanent organization of a citizens' party, or to provide
for its further existence. The Republican chairman had
the tickets printed and placed in the booths, and the
Republican party issued no tickets, though the Democratic
party did. Occasionally, in previous years, tickets known
as ''citizens' " tickets had been used in that town. On
Delaware laws, 189r, ch. 37, 3.
Fields v. Osborne, 6o Conn., 544.
In Connecticut the ballots are printed by the party organizations,
on official paper, and enclosed in official envelopes by the voters. This
system is far less practical and effective than that of official ballots.
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these facts the Court held that a citizens' party had existed
in that town at the time of that election.In Michigan any party may make nominations by a
"regularly called convention." It has there been hdld that
where a regular call resulted in the holding of two conventions of a certain party, the board of election commissioners
could not refuse to receive and print the names of either
set of candidates. "We do not consider," said the Court,
" that it is the province of the board of election commissioners to determine which convention represented the
regular nominating convention of the party; but that it is
the duty of said board to print and place upon the ballots
the names of the candidates certified to them by the committee of either branch of the party represented by the two
conventions held to nominate city officers, and that the
names so certified to them in each list shall be embraced in
the ticket so p-inted; and that it is their duty, further, if
the same name of a party shall be certified by each of two
committees, that the name so certified shall be printed
without further addition or distinctive designation than
such as is contained in the certificates furnished.I" Had
the candidates of either convention sought to prevent the
names of the others from being printed on the ballots, on
account of irregularities in their nomination, a decision
between them would, perhaps, have been made, but since
there seems to have been no attempt to show that either
convention was not "regularly called," in conformity with
the statute, and properly conducted as well, the decision
reached seems- correct,- for, if "regularly called," both
conventions had apparently the same right to nominate
candidates as if they had .represented different parties.,
Confusion might arise from the dual use of the party
name, but, in theory of law party names are not elected
to office.
In Colorado it is held that by the statute the Secretary
of State can only hear objections as to matters of form, so
.that if a convention splits he cannot decide which faction
I Shields

v. Jacob, 88 Mich., 164.
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III

is entitled to represent the party, but must certify both sets
of candidates, and allow them the same party name.'
Where the case requires it a court will decide which
of two rival conventions is the regular convention of the
party, or whether, in point of fact, the proceedings of
either convention were sufficiently lawful to sustain the
nominations which it has undertaken to make. Thus
it has been held that the delegates from two counties, being
a minority of the whole convention of three counties,
cannot meet by themselves and make nominations. 2 It has,
indeed, been contended that "a political convention is a
law unto itself, and that whatever methods it adopts for its
own government are conclusive and cannot be made the
.subject of judicial inquiry." Although this contention
may be true to a certain extent, yet, as was said in a New
York case,3 "when the duty is cast upon courts and judges
of determining the regularity and fairness 'of political
methods, those methods must be subjected to the same
tests as would those of any other body of men whose good
faith is questioned, and no court or judge would be justified
in sustaining them when found to be inconsistent with that
degree of sound morals which must characterize an ordinary
affair of business, even though they be recognized and
approved by senatorial and State conventions of the same
political organizations."
The Supreme Court of Missouri has expressed the
same view in the following words: "The same consideration which should induce courts of justice to maintain the
purity of the ballot box when the final vote is taken
should equally operate with them to promote honesty and
prevent and condemn fraud when a preliminary vote is
taken or a nominating convention held. There can be no
difference in principle in its application to the various
situations mentioned; and though it is said that ' the Decalogue has no place in politics,' yet when the tribunals of
'People v. District Court, 31 Pac. Rep., 339.
2 State v. Weir (Wash.), 31 Pac. Rep., 4r7.
2n re Woodworth, 16 N. Y. Supp., 147.
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the country are appealed to in matters having political
complexion and bearing, when they once acquire jurisdiction of such matters in a- proper way, they will administer
justice, promote honest dealing and condemn fraud precisely as they do when administering the law. in cases
sounding in damages or sounding in contract." 1
In New York the proceedings at primary meetings are
regulated by law, and hence the question whether a nomination was made by "an organized assemblage of voters or
delegates representing a political party," involves farther
questions as to the regularity of the nominating conventions and of the caucuses which elected the delegates.
Other things being equal, the decision will be in favor of a
caucus at which all the provisiois of the law as to primary
meetings were observed as against one where the law was
disregarded, and also in favor of the more numerously
attended caucus." A decision as to the regularity of a
caucus, if not appealed from, must be respected, and no
recognition by any authority in the party can change the
status of a caucus which has been decided not to have been
an assemblage representing the party.3 Where a certificate
of nomination shows on its face that the convention was
composed of delegates who did not receive the requisite
number of votes at the primary meeting, it cannot be
validated by any central committee of the paity, as the
statute gives no such committee any supervisory power of
$The proceedings of caucuses and conventions.' Manifestly
illegal acts of the party authorities can, of course, confer no
rights upon political assemblies or their members, and if it
be attempted to exclude authorized delegates from a meeting and to pack it with unauthorized persons, and a quorum
of the authorized delegates proceed to meet elsewhere, they
will be regarded as the regular body.5 It has further been
held in New York that where a call for a primary meeting
I State v.
2 In

Lesueur, 103 M o., 263.
re Woodworth, i6 N. Y. Supp., 147.

3Ibid.

4 Matter of Cowie, 25 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.), 455.

5 In re Woodworth, i6 N. Y. Supp., x47.
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of members of a certain party has been publicly posted,
and a ticket nominated and duly certified and filed, an
objection that such meeting was an irregular body, not the
regular party, is frivolous; that no matter what the body
of voters may have called themselves,, if a ticket be nominated and filed according to law, the candidates' names
should be printed.' It has been held in Missouri that an
agreement between opposing candidates for a nomination
to submit their claims to the decision of a committee of
their party is binding on them by way of estoppel,' but
this results from the general doctrine of estoppel rather than
from the provisions of the statute in regard to nominations.
The Pennsylvania statute requires certificates of nomination to be filed by conventions, primary meetings, etc.,
held "under the rules of" political parties. Under this it
has been held that if the party rules empower any coinmittee to decide between rival conventions or other assemblages, and the. question comes before the committee in the
manner provided by the rule, the Court will sustain the
committee's decision, 3 but unless the question be so brought
before such committee its action cannot affect the matter,
and the Court will decide which assemblage, if either, was
regularly held.'
Irregularities in the election of some of the delegates
to a nominating convention regularly called and held, or of
some of the ward committees that have certified the credentials of delegates to such convention, will not invalidate
a nomination made thereat, especially if such irregularities
have since been validated under the party rules.' Also
minor failures to comply with the party rules in the procedure at a convention are immaterial, if no fraud be
intended, nor any voter embarrassed, and such irregularity
were not caused by the action of the candidate nominated,
People v. Ryan, 6o Hun. (N. Y.), 3 9S.
State v. Lesneur, 103 Mo., 263.
Donahue's Nomination, 2 Dist. Rep. (Pa.), 5.
4 Dailey's Case, i Dist. Rep. (Pa.), 764.
3 Ker's Nomination, 2 Dist. Rep. (Pa.), 14.
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nor in his interest, and no change in the ultimate result be
proved to have been wrought thereby.'
Decisions have been rendered on various other points
in regard to nominations as follows: The requirements of a
secret ballot law as to the time of filing nomination certificates or papers and as to their form are mandatory, and a
certificate or paper not in proper form, or presented after
the time, should be refused,' unless- it is for an office which
has become vacant after the time for making legal nominations has elapsed, so that compliance with the requirement
as to time was impossible.' A provision for allowing the
names of candidates to be substituted in the place of such
as have died or withdrawn since their nomination does not
authorize the curing of defects in nominations already
made, nor the supplying of nominations when none were
properly made within the time allowed.4 Though the
duties of the officers with whom nomination certificates
have been filed are ministerial they have authority to pass
on their sufficiency as to matters appearing on their face
(e. g., as to whether they are acknowledged or not) before
allowing them to be filed.5 Whether a political party has
polled: the requisite percentage of votes to entitle it to
nominate as a party is a question of fact, to be decided by
the proper court on objections duly filed,' and no objection
to a nomination will be entertained unless duly filed.7 A
"nomination paper" may consist of separate but similar
papers containing signatures, provided each such paper be
in proper form and the signatures thereon duly verified.8 A
I Littey's Nomination, i Dist. Rep. (Pa.), 8o6.
' Lucas v. Ringsrud (S. Dak.), 53 N. W. Rep., 426. The time is
days before the
computed by the ordinary legal rule,so that "at leastday of the election" excludes the day of the election and includes the
first day of the period: Certificates of Nomination, i Dist. Rep. (Pa.), 760.
3 Clay's Nomination, 2 Dist. Rep. (Pa.), 19.
'Lucas v. Ringsrud (S. Dak.), 53 N. W. Rep., 426.
5State v. Lesueur, 103 Mo., 263.

6Robbins v. Harrity, 2 Dist. Rep. (Pa.), 163.
s

7 Van Storch's Nomination,
ina.

' King's Nomination,

i

2

Dist. Rep. (Pa.), 7 ; Robbins v. Harrity,

fist. Rep. (Pa.), 807.
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percentage of the votes cast for an officer elected in a district at the last election must be based upon the vote cast
for an officer elected by and for that district, not upon the
vote cast in that district for a State officer.' After election
the validity of nominations can be inquired into only by
proceedings in the nature of a contest, not by the board of
canvassers, whose duty is merely to canvass the returns as
presented.2
IL Cases in Regard to lie Form and Use of /he Ballot.
-In the form and use of the ballot a marked difference
exists between those laws which have adopted the Australian arrangement and those which have adopted the
Belgian. The former require the names of all candidates
for an office to be printed, with their proper political designations, under the title of the office, in the order either of
their surnames or of their parties, and the name of each
candidate voted for is marked separately. The 'latter pro%ridethat the names of all the candidates nominated by the
same political party shall be printed in a column under the
party name, and that a mark against that name shall be
equivalent to a vote for every candidate of the party. In
three States the names are arranged by the former method,
but may be voted for by the latter, the party names being
placed by themselves at the top of the ballot. The only
reason for the Belgian arrangement is that it enables those
who desire to vote a straight party ticket to do so with the
greatest possible ease; and as this privilege is usually confined by law to the supporters of a party entitled to
nominate by certificate, to the exclusion of the supporters
of candidates nominated by papers signed by citizens, and
cannot possibly be enjoyed by those who wish to vote independently of party, very strong argunents can be brought
against it as affecting injuriously the rights of the citizen,
his exercise of due consideration in voting, and even the
'King's Nomination, i Dist. Rep. (Pa.), 807.
-State v. Board of Canvassers (Mont.), 31 Pac. Rep., 536.
"Arkansas, North Dakota and Oregon. The law was the same in
Califor.nia, until declared unconstilutional in Eaton v. Brown, ihfra.
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secrecy of the ballot. On the first of these grounds the
very important California case of Eaton v. Brown,' a case
of absolutely first impression, was recently decided. The
privileges given to political parties by the ballot law of
that State had led to the forming of an organization called
the "Citizens' Non-partisan Party," which nominated candidates and sought to compel the printing of their names
under the party title, so that they could all be voted for by a
single mark. The Court refused the mandamus, but granted
in effect more than the relators sought, for the provision
for voting by a single mark was declared "unconstitutional
and wholly void." "It is," said the Court, "an attempt
to discriminate against classes of voters, and its effect, if
allowed to be valid, would be.to subject such classes to the
alternative of partial disfranchisement or to the casting of
their votes upon more burdensome conditions than others
no better entitled, under the fundamental law, to the free
and untramnfeled exercise of the right of suffrage. We
hold that this provision destroys the just and equal and
uniform operation which in an- election law; of all others,
is demanded no less by the express terms of our fundamental law than by the genius and spirit of our institutions. It is, therefore, void and inoperative. : There should
be no party designations printed at the head of the tickets,
because there can be no voting by stamping. such designation. Voters can only express their choice by placing a
stamp opposite the name of their candidate for each office,
or by writing the name of a candidate in the blank space
left therefor, except only in the case of presidential electors,
who may, under the law, be voted for in groups by a single
impression of the stamp."
The California law was one of four which adopted the
mixed system above mentioned, and it was flurther peculiar
in providing that if a party's name were marked on a ballot,
-a vote for any candidate of another party would invalidate
the whole ballot, and not merely as regarded the particular
'31 Pac. Rep., 250.
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office, but the principle involved would have been the same
even without such a provision. The decision could be used

as a precedent not only in Arkansas, North Dakota and
Oregon, where the form of the ballot is precisely as in
California, but also in at least twelve other States where
the party-column arrangement is used. The importance of
this case cannot be overestimated, and it accords with the
highest principles of constitutional law and the most
comprehensive views of public policy.
The provisions regulating the modes of marking a
ballot differ somewhat in the different States, and some provisions are so worded to be mandatory, while others are
directory only. The provisions of the Indiana statute,
requiring the marks to be stamped on certain squares, has
been held mandatory, and no other mode of marking is
allowed;' whereas in Rhode Island, while a cross alone can
be used, and it must be placed in the margin to the right
of the candidate's name, it need not be placed within
the square printed for the purpose of receiving it.2 In
Nebraska the requirement that the marks shall be made
with ink has been held directory merely, so that a mark
made with a pencil is a sufficient compliance with it in the
absence of fraud, and if the ballot be in other respects
valid.'
If the ballot is to be absolutely secret no one should
be allowed to see it during the process of marking, except
the voter himself. Strict application of this rule would
disfranchise all voters who, from blindness or other bodily
infirmity, are physically unable to mark their ballots
unaided, and it would also greatly inconvenience those who
can not read. Assistance in the marking, even at the
expense of strict secrecy, is allowed for physical causes in
all secret ballot laws, and the same exception is usually
made in the case of illiterates, unless they are excluded
Parvin v. Winxberg, 30 N. E. Rep., 790.
re Vote Marks, 2 AtL. Rep., 942.
:1State v. Russell, 5I N. W. Rep., 465. The same doctrine is seen in
2 fit

Crawford, 91 Cal., 526. a case under the old law.
Rutledge z'.
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from voting altogether by an educational qualification for
the suffrage. On the question of whether such exception
is necessary the authorities are divided. It is held in
Kentucky,1 where the bill of rights, declares that "elections
shall be free and equal," that a law requiring voters to
mark their ballots alone and unaided is inoperative to the
extent that it "deprives illiterate persons of the opportunity
and means of freely and intelligibly voting, for they have
the right to avail themselves of whatever reasonable aid
and information may be necessary to enable them to cast
their ballots understandingly, and cannot be legally deprived of it."
The Constitution of Tennessee resembles that of Kentucky in requiring thlat elections shall be "free and equal,"
but another article adds the proviso that the legislature
shall have power to enact laws "to secure the freedom of
elections and the purity of the ballot box." Under this
proviso it washeld that a law which did not allow illiterates
to be helped in voting was not unconstitutional.
"The
purpose of the law before us," said the Court, "is to
require the voter to cast his own ballot, to do away, as far
as possible, with the illegal practice of voting oftener than
once existing in some quarters of the State, and to defeat
bribery, duress and corruption at the polls. The law is
plain and simple in its provisions. Every voter, however
illiterate, can always find a friend to himself, or some one
candidate, who will read and explain the law and the manner of its observance. Ballots and cards of instruction are
always at hand. The names of candidates are printed, and
with little effort the unlettered voter can soon become as well
acquainted with the printed name of his candidate as with
his face, and with easy readiness place his cross opposite
that name and fold his ticket as required. The argument
of inconvenience is as nothing compared to the rights
1

Rogers v. Jacob, 88 Ky., 502. The same decision would probably
have been rendered in Michigan (see Common Council v. Rush, 82 Mich.,
532), where, however, owing to a difference in the law, this precise point
did not arise.
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intended to be protected by that inconvenience. The inconvenience to a part of the community must yield to the good
of the whole."' This decision, as already stated, was based
on the express grant of power to the legislature to protect
the freedom and purity of the ballot, but this freedom and
purity were in effect required already by the bill of rights,
and a legislature's power to enforce the bill of rights needs
no express grant. Hence, that grant seems not to be
essential to the decision, which may, therefore, be understood as squarely opposed to that rendered in Kentucky,
and as placing the secrecy of the ballot above the convenience of illiterates, even where no educational qualification for the suffrage exists, a doctrine apparently recognized
also in Mississippi' before the present educational qualification took effect.
Any violation of the legal requirements of secrecy
necessarily vitiates the ballots affected thereby.- Thus in
Mississippi' a petition for a contest averred that in a certain
district an election officer had marked ballots for certain
illiterate voters who were not blind or physically disabled,
so that they did not even know for whom they were voting.
The evidence offered in support of this averment was not
admitted, and a demurrer to the petition was sustained. On
appeal the Supreme Court reversed this judgment and
remanded the case, saying, "The evidence of London and
others, if true, stamps the returns from that box as false
and fraudulent. The petition in effect charged that fortyone votes were illegally cast at Brunswick, which by collusion with election officers were received and counted for the
appellee, and the excluded evidence went directly and
specifically to the support of this charge. The demurrer
should have been overruled and the evidence should have
been received. Whatever the true interpretation of Sections 241 and 242 of time new Constitution, and of the election ordinance of the Convention may be, it is certain that
I Cook v. State, 90 Ten,., 407.
Sproule v. Fredericks, ii So. Rep.,
1'Ibid.
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neither was designed, in whole or in part, to make the electors the mere creatures for registering the will and choice
of the officers of the election. It is clear that the conversion of these officers into partisan managers and political
bosses was not the purpose of the convention or ordinance."
While the Court laid particular stress on the fact that the
illegal marking had been done by an election officer, the
gist of the decision clearly is that ballots marked in violation of the secrecy required by the law are illegal, and
should not be counted, a conclusion which has also been
reached in Michigan in a case where voters had marked
their ballots in the presence of other persons.'
Under the Australian arrangement, described above,
the ballot is regarded in England as containing "a list of the
candidates and not a list of.their nominations," so that each
candidate's name appears once only,2 even if he receives
more than one nomination; but it has been thought otherwise in Nebraska,3 while in Maryland, under the Belgian
system of printing the names in party columns, the name
4
must appear in a different column for each nomination.
Under the unique New York statute a separate ballot
is printed for each independent candidate, unless his supporters select the names of candidates for other offices to
appear with his on the ballots.5
The question of what constitutes such a distinguishing
mark upon a ballot as to infringe the provisions which forbid
the use of ballots so marked as to be capable of identi-fication has arisen in a few cases. In New York, where separate
party ballots are used, the outside also of all those used
at the same voting place must be alike in order to preserve
the secrecy of their contents. It has there been held that
the endorsement for another voting place than that at which
they are used is "a distinguishing mark on the outside" of
I Atty'-Gen. v. MeQuade, 53 N. W. Rep., 944.
gusson, 51 Id., 1073.
SNorthcote v. Pulsford, L. R., IO C. P., 476.
3State v. Stein, 53 N. W. Rep., 999.
4 Fisher v. Dudley, 74 Md., 242.
5
.People v. Kaiser, 25 Ab. N. C. (N. Y.), 462.

See MeQuade v. Fer-
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the ballots, and hence that ballots so endorsed cannot be
counted.' The fact that the error was that of certain officials was held immaterial by the majority of the Court, on
the ground that it was the voters' duty to see that their
ballots were properly endorsed, but in a dissenting opinion
it was forcibly urged that the names of the candidates being
the same as onl the proper ballots, the form of endorsement
was unlikely to attract a voter's attention, and also that
the error of the officers in issuing and receiving the wrong
ballots ought not to disfranchise the voters. This point
will be considered below.
The use of a paster with a name not on the official
ballot does not constitute a distinguishing mark upon the
ballots upon which it is used,' but the erasure of a particular name onl the ballot or paster and the writing of another
name in its place is a distinguishing mark if so intended,
and the facts requisite to condemn a ballot because so
marked may be proved by any competent evidence, either
that of the voter himself, or of any person who has narked
it, or by other evidence against their testimony.'
The word "for," preceding the title of an office, is
not a distinguishing mark in Connecticut if used on all
the ballots of a particular party at a given voting place,'
but it might be so if used in some ballots of that party
only."
A person who is familiar with the construction of the
machinery of a patent ballot box may testify as an expert
that in his opinion the marks on a ballot might have been
made by such machinery rather than by the voter.'
11. Cases in Regard to the Errors of Public Officers.
-The results of official neglect in the use of ballots at
another voting place than that for which they were endorsed
I People u. Board

of Canvassers, 129 N. Y., 395.
2 People v. Shaw, 133 N. Y., 493.
.People v. Board of Supervisors (N. Y.), 32 N. E. Rep., 242.
'Fields -, Osborne, 6o Con., 544; State v. Walsh (Conn.), 25 Atl
Rep., x.
5 Fields v.Osborne, 6o Conn., 544.
GConvery v. Conger, 53 N. J. L., 4 6S.
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are in New York, as already noticed in the case of People
v. Board of Canvassers,' cast upon the voters who use them,
and this because such ballots are not properly endorsed for
the voting places where they are used, as well as for the
effect of the endorsement as a distinguishing mark. This
doctrine, which has -been criticised in other States,2 is extremely technical, and there is much force in the dissenting
remark of P9CKHAM, J., that "to utterly disfranchise hundreds of innocent legal voters because the employee or
messenger of some public- officer made a mistake like the
one in question, seems to me to work a burlesque on the
ballot act and its construction."
Inasmuch as the object
of an election is to obtain a free expression of the choice of
the voters, and there was no evidence that the use of the
wrongly endorsed ballots hindered this free expression or
affects the secrecy of the ballot, their rejection certainly
defeated the .lawful intention of the voters in that particular case.
The case of Talcott v. Philbrick,' in Connecticut, somewhat resembles People v. Board of Canvassers, though it
did not involve the error of any public officer. The Connecticut law provides that the ballots which are printed
and placed in the booths by the party organizations shall
contain the name of the political party issuing them. In
a certain town where it had long been customary to elect
local officers on a "citizens' ticket," certain ballots which
had the heading "cftizens" were printed and voted. It
appeared that no "citizens' party " existed, and that the
ballots had been printed by the Republican committee, but
that they were not prepared fraudulently nor to deceive
the voters, and that no such result had been produced by
them. A majority of the Court held, however, that they
129 N. Y., 395-

Bowers v. Smith (Mo.), 20 S. W. Rep., ioi (where it was said "Such
a construction of a law as would permit the disfranchisement of large
bodies of voters because of an error of a single official should never be
adopted where the language in question is fairly susceptible of any
other"): State v. Russell (Neb.), 51 N. W. Rep., 465.
359 Conn., 472.
2
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could not be counted because they did not contain, as required by the law, the name of the party that had caused
them to be printed, although as pointed out in a dissenting
opinion the voters had obtained them in the place where
the law directed that ballots should be obtained.
The New York and Connecticut cases may have correctly interpreted the legislative intent, but they forcibly
illustrate the peril to voters from departure from the essentials of the true Australian system. Had official ballots
been used in Connecticut such a case as Talcott v. Philbrick could not have arisen, while had the blanket ballot
been used in New York the error could not have been (as
it was perhaps intended to be) so limited as to affect the
voters of one party only, and as all the ballots used
would have had the same endorsement, it could not have
been claimed that an error in the endorsement would affect
the secrecy.
In New Jersey it was held, in State v. Black,' that the
risk of the rejection of votes on account of official neglect
or error in the printing of the ballots, without fault of the
voter, is no argument against the constitutionality of the
law, the Court seeming to admit that such neglect or error
would invalidate the ballots. In Colorado errors in a party
emblem or in the position of a candidate's name must be
objected to before the election, and if not corrected then
they will be treated as immaterial.' The honest mistake of
election officers, in endorsing ballots in the wrong place,
has been held immaterial in Indiana.3
It has been held in Montana that where a successful
candidate has not really been entitled to have his name
printed on the ballot because of some defect in his nomination, his election was invalid, and a judgment to quash
the statement of contest should be reversed.4 In Missouri,
however, the fact that the names of certain candidates were
Atl. Rep., 489.
Allen v. Glynn, 29 Pac. Rep., 69o.
3 Parvin v. Wimberg, 3o N. E. Rep., 790.
4 Price v. Lush, IO Mont., 6i.
24
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unlawfully printed on the ballots used in a certain election
district was held to be no reason for throwing out the votes
cast in that district in a contest between other candidates,
whose names were lawfully printed.' The majority of the
Court considered that as the law did not declare that the
illegal addition of names to the ballot would vitiate the
election, it must be treated as an irregularity which, if it
were free from fraud and did not interfere with a fair
expression of the will of the voters, should be disregarded,
the contestant not having availed himself at the proper
time before the election, of his right, under the law, to
object to the addition of the tiames and to have the error
"Having regard," said the Court, " to the
corrected.
spirit and purpose of the Missouri statute, and to the general principles governing the treatment of popular elections
by the courts in this country, we think it should be held
that, where a candidate for public office causes no timely
objection to be made before the election, he should be
regarded as having waived all objections that may exist to
the presence on the official ballot of the names of nominees
not properly entitled to be there."
-In the same opinion the decision in Price v. Lush ' was
objected to as misapplying the English cases and as overlooking the provision in the Montana statute, similar to
the Missouri provision, for the correction of errors in the
ballot before the election. The first criticism is well
founded, for the English law as to objections to nominations (35 and 36 Vict., ch. 33, sched. I, § 13; extended to
municipal elections by 38 and 39 Vict., ch. 40, § I), pro-

vided that the decision of the returning officer disallowing
an objection is final, but that his decision allowing it is
subject to reversal on petition questioning the election or
return. Hence such cases as Price v. Lush3 and Bowers v.
Smith,' involving the illegal printing of names on the
Bowers v. Smith, 17 N. V. Rep., 761; 20 S. W. Rep., ioi.
IO Mont., 61.
8 Ibid.
4

20 S. W. Rep., io.
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ballots, could not have occurred in England. The second
criticism seems valid also, but there is this important
difference between Price v. Lush and Bowers v. Smith,
that in the former the name illegally printed was that of
the contestee limself, while in the latter the names were
those of third parties.
The cases oi official errors suggest the advisability of
adding a new provision to the secret ballot laws. The
chance of serious errors in the official ballots, or in the
conduct of an election in other respects, may be remote, but
it should be provided for. As such errors must occur, if at
all, without the fault of the voters who use the ballots, the
statute should guard against the possibility of such errors
resulting in practical disfranchisement. Under the old
ballot laws any error in a ballot was regarded as arising by
the voter's own fault, and defective ballots were properly
rejected from the count. Hence in a contest the candidate
who was proved, to have received the greatest number of
lawful ballots was declared elected. Such a rule must
work unjustly where, as in People v. Board of Canvassers,1
the error is not due to the action of the voters themselves,
and hence the statutes should provide, as is partly done in
that of Pennsylvania, 2 that where the result of the entire
election for any office be proved to have been affected,
actually or probably, by an error in the ballots or in any
other feature of the election, without the fault of the voters
themselves, the election for that office shall be declared
void, and a new election for such office shall be held without delay.
Philade46hia,Jantan),, 18S93.
129 N. Y., 395• Act of June 19, 1891, ; 30; Purd. Dig. Supp. 2493, pl. 63.

